Indiana Law Journal
Volume 36

Issue 4

Article 9

Summer 1961

The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals, by Karl N.
Llewellyn
James L. Magrish
College of Law, University of Cincinnati

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Common Law Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons

Recommended Citation
Magrish, James L. (1961) "The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals, by Karl N. Llewellyn," Indiana
Law Journal: Vol. 36 : Iss. 4 , Article 9.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol36/iss4/9

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open
access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository
@ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

BOOK REVIEWS
THE COMMON LAw TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS. By Karl
N. Llewellyn. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1960. Pp. xii, 565. $8.50.
Rabelais, in his sixteenth century satire on the Renaissance, portrays
how "Judge Bridlegoose" decided law cases by "the chance and fortune
of the dice."' Although Rabelais's satire has been called "incisive but
essentially good-natured," 2 the taunt now directed at the Bar and Bench
that law cases currently are decided by the chance of how judges happen
to wish to decide, is too serious for jest. Yet, when we come to defend
against the taunt of chance decisions, what shall we deny and what shall
we assert is in fact the case? If elements of chance in the making of
decisions are admitted, what kinds of remedies should be proposed?
These questions become important in considering Professor Karl
N. Llewellyn's recently published "The Common Law Tradition," a
book bearing the sub-title "Deciding Appeals." In it we find a vigorous
attack made in homespun language frequently teeming with excitement,
upon what we are told is the worry of the Bar as to whether there is
any "reckonability" in the work of our appellate courts, whether there
is any real stability of footing for the lawyer in appellate litigation or
in counseling, and whether there is any effective craftsmanship for the
lawyer to bring to bear to serve his client and to justify his being. The
Bar's ill founded worry of the lack of "reckonability," Llewellyn contends, brings us face to face with a crisis in confidence. He tells us
that the work of our appellate courts all over the country not only is
reckonable, but is so on a relative scale, far beyond what any sane man
has any business expecting from a machinery devoted to settling difficult disputes.3
Llewellyn states that today's typical appellate judge is interested,
first of all, in getting the case decided right within the authorities, and
that it is this goal which gives the main drive and direction to his labors.
Illustrations are given of the judges' concern for "Sense," "Wisdom"
and "Justice," for a standard of wisdom, rather than a personal standard,
and for the employment of what Llewellyn calls "horse sense." The

1. Rabelais,

Gargantua, Book III, Ch. X (1550), reprinted in COHEN & COHEN,

READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

2.
3.

COHEN & COHEN, supra note 1 at 440.
Pp. 3-4.

440 (1951).
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latter is "that extraordinary and uncommon kind of experience, sense,
and intuition which was characteristic of an old-fashioned skilled horse
trader in his dealings either with horses or with other horse traders."
Llewellyn is aware of possible and actual miscarriages of justice. In
criticizing an important case, he does not hesitate to describe the result
as "another instance in which shrewd appellate advocacy has sold a pup
to one of the best of our judges."'
Llewellyn attacks what he calls a baleful line of reading, thinking
and teaching, leading to the false conclusion that courts can and do
decide any way they want to and then write opinions to suit. He seeks
an answer to the lawyer's question as to how an appellate tribunal
arrives at the particular and concrete answer in a particular and concrete case. He lists and discusses fourteen of what he calls major steadying factors in our appellate courts, namely: "law-conditioned officials,"
"legal doctrine," "known doctrinal techniques," "responsibility for justice," "the tradition of one single right answer," "an opinion of the
court," "a frozen record from below," "issues limited, sharpened and
phrased in advance," "adversary argument by counsel," "group decision,"
"judicial security and honesty," "a known bench," "the general periodstyle and its promise," and lastly "professional judicial office."'
In a discussion of "The Leeways of Precedent," he argues against
what he calls a basic false conception that precedents will in fact and
ought simply to dictate the decision in the current case. He observes
that this false conception of precedents casts our style of legal argument
in its mold, and that this "misimage seduces counsel into judgment and
behavior based on the crazy premise that if you have a good case on
available doctrine you therefore have a winning case. .

. ."'

We are

shown that the "Grand Style" recognized that "The reason and spirit
of cases make law, not the letter of particular precedents," and that our
precedent-system still is what it has so long been: a system of guidance
and suggestion and pressure, and only on occasion a system of dictationcontrol. Some sixty-four categories are listed by which courts use
precedent techniques. Most of the techniques are used legitimately
but some of them are used illegitimately.'
In considering "Situation-sense and Reason," Llewellyn stresses
what he calls the differential impact of the facts of the individual case
as compared with the facts of the situation taken as a type. He quotes
4. Pp. 41, 59, 201, 440.

5. Pp. 13, 19 ff.
6. P. 62.
7. Pp. 63, 75, 77 ff.
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With approval "that amazing legal historian and commercial lawyer,
Levin Goldschmidt: 'Every fact-pattern of common life, so far as the
legal order can take it in, carries within itself its appropriate, natural
rules, its right law ....

The highest task of law-giving consists in un-

covering and implementing this imminent law.'" Illustrations are given
from the decided cases to show what is called the unceasing thrust of
the situation-facts toward a fair solution and toward application, development or readaptation of doctrine to decent ends.'
Noting that the function of the opinion is not to report how the
decision was arrived at, he concludes that many opinions are written to
convince other judges on the same bench of the soundness of the
opinions, ("to pick up votes, or to hold votes"), and that the opinion
is intended to do a right job as such, to let losing counsel see they have
been fairly heard, to persuade the interested public, and to provide wise
guidance for the future. Cases from various states are praised in terms
of the situation-sense and reason which the courts applied. The reader
is expected for the most part to find the meaning of these terms if he
finds himself in agreement with the cases.'
In a chapter on the "Reckonability of Results: Theory of Rules,"
the author formulates what he calls laws of "Compatibility" and "Incompatibility," and of the "Singing Reason." He contends that unremitting labor by courts in the "Grand Style" means a cumulative output
of rules ever sharper in form, ever sounder in substance. Yet he suggests that measured against the large inept or obsolescent stockpile of
existing rules, the task is still one for generations. What we need, he
says, is ". . . that certainty after the event which makes ordinary men
and lawyers recognize as soon as they see the result, that . . .it is the

right result." He considers that advocacy informs the court at the
appellate stage about wise choice of concepts and about the consequent
rule. At times the advocacy is done so persuasively that "the court
turns its back on the plain text of a statute to strong-arm an exception
which the legislature has lacked the knowledge and prudence to
provide."1
In a chapter entitled "Appellate Judging as a Craft of Law" he
attacks various misconceptions about the appellate judging process and
suggests some explanation for them. The misconceptions include the
notion that deciding, even in the tough case, can be essentially an intellectual or intellectualizable process. He urges that appellate judging
8.

Pp. 121-122, 125.

9. Pp. 132 ff.

10. Pp. 178 ff, 183-185, 212.
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is a central craft of the institution of Law-Government and that a
healthy craft elicits ideals, pride and responsibility in its craftsmen.
The task of the lawyer contemplating an appeal is described as the
exploration and comparison in his imagination of the various lines of
attack open to him after he has found the sense phase of his cause not
to be an insurmountable barrier. He urges that it is the counsel's
business to get into the pleadings and the proofs material which makes
the situation come alive to the court, explain itself and educate the court
into such sympathetic appreciation of the situation that the court will
be able to discover or at least to recognize its "imminent law.""
In his chapter on "Argument," he contends that the cases showing
how the appellate courts do their work can instruct the lawyer not only
on how to help them do it, but on how to help them do it in his favor.
He gives what he calls "Seven ABC's of Appellate Argument," and
observes that there frequently is an equally perfect technical case to be
made on each side. 'Since the struggle then will be for court acceptance
of the one technically perfect view of the law as against the other, he
says that acceptance will and ought to turn on something beyond "legal
correctness." He ends his seven "ABC's" with the "Principle of Concentration of Fire," pointing out that even two or three points can prove
troublesome as dividers of the court's attention unless a way can be
found to make them sub-points of a single simple line of attack. He
cautions against dealing simply with the appellant's points as the appellant made them, urges oral argument and the use of a brief proffering the court an "opinion-kernel" so put as to demand "to be lifted into
the opinion." He concedes to the advocate that his task in the run of
cases is to win the case for his client, not to improve the law; and that
a truly right rule for the future is neither to be demanded nor expected
if the client's case might be disserved thereby. 2
A chapter is provided on "Conclusions For Courts." They are
cautioned against deliberately turning their backs upon pertinent but
uncomfortable authorities, as a "sin against the nature of our case law."
The author inquires whether articulate rules for the work of the appellate
courts would handicap or further their job. In this connection he mentions the old tale of the centipede who, on pondering how he managed
the coordination of his legs, discovered in panic that he no longer could.
He does not fear that articulate principles of appellate judging would
impair judges' work and concludes that there is a need for a conscious
11. Pp. 213-219, 227, 232.
12. Pp. 236 ff, 244.
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working philosophy of the craft of appellate judges."
In an Appendix the author summarizes and defends what he has
written and has tried to do. He states that he puts the book forward
"as a solid and unmistakable product and embodiment of American
Legal Realism." He contends that "Realism" never was a philosophy
but rather was and is only a method. He notes requirements of the
method such as--"See it fresh"; "See it as it works." From such requirements, one goes on, he says, to the inquiry about "What it is for
(function

or goal).

-*""

The "reckonability"

claimed for the

appellate process needs to be judged from these points of view.
Yet it should be noted that for Llewellyn the existing body of legal
doctrine includes not merely the very elaborate body of rules of law in
statutes and in judicial opinions, but also the accepted lines of organizing and seeing these materials; concepts, "fields" of law, pervading
principles, living ideals, tendencies, constellations, tone.1" With so much
included in the notion of legal doctrine, the material available to appellate
courts to enable them to determine what they ought to do in deciding
appeals and available to counsel in order to reckon what the courts will
do, has few limitations. The difficulties of the courts as instruments
in a system of government are compounded, since as Llewellyn recognizes, the system serves issues to them "only a tiny slice at a time, and
leaves the choice of the particular tiny slice to happenstance, to such
accidents as which kind of a dispute happens to break out first, with
also at least one party on one side who is obnoxious or a lion or insolvent
or else in the hands of a lawyer either signally inept or preternaturally
able."" 6 Under these circumstances, the meaning of "reckonability" as
applied to the appellate process is highly complex.
"Reckonability" on other than a very rough and ready basis would
seem weak unless it contemplated the prediction of both the outcome
of an appeal and the achievement of the rightness, the wisdom and the
sense for which the courts strive. Unless such dual "reckonability" is
possible, the denial of chance decisions has little sighiificance. An assertion that the appellate process generally results in chance decisions presents a claim that there is no or insufficient connection between the
appellate method and the assumed ideals. Such an assertion, Llewellyn
of course, would deny. On the other hand, an assertion of "reckonability" should urge a connection between the employment of the method
13. Pp. 256 ff, 264, 267.

14. Pp. 508-520.
15. P. 20.
16. P. 263.

BOOK REVIEWS
and the achievement of the recognized ideals and should imply an ability
on the part of lawyers to "predict" that courts will decide as they ought
to decide. Assuming that the book makes such an assertion, it may
be observed that there is a clear distinction between a prediction of the
outcome of litigation and a determination by the judge of what the
outcome ought rationally to be. 7 Since a chapter in the "Common Law
Tradition" is devoted to "Argument: The Art of Making Prophecy
Come True," we may ask what happens if the lawyers on both sides of
the same appeal read the book and especially study this chapter. Since
ancient times, the techniques of rhetofic and eristic have been fairly
well defined. We know that men consciously can engage in plausible
reasoning or reason from false premises to achieve victories. All would
agree that the appellate process contemplates the detection of such techniques and the avoidance of the victories such techniques seek to obtain.
Neither Llewellyn's insistence that Realism is a method, and not a
philosophy, nor his description of its approach offers sufficient help to
meet the demands of the appellate process.
In the light of such problems it seems to this reviewer that a larger
framework and more unifying concepts than we have been given are
needed for an appellate method even tentatively adequate for the accepted
goals of wisdom, justice, sense and the reduction of miscarriages. In
the formulation of a method of deciding appeals, greater note can be
taken of prior studies to present the larger structure and the concepts
within which human reason and human language must operate. Assistance seems possible by invoking analogies between problems in making
ethical and moral decisions, and legal decisions. For example, the
question whether these are "emotive" or "cognitive" needs to be faced.
WXlhile the tenor, if not the language of Llewellyn's discussions seems
to deny mere emotive significance for judicial decisions, at times Llewellyn
seems to be assuming some non-empirical sources of knowledge, some
mystical ability, if not to know what justice is, then at least to know what
is unjust. With proper allowances for Llewellyn's position that he is
dealing with "ABC's and is trying to keep his key terms fittingly blunt
and simple," judicial method requires a better theoretical structure than
indicated by the explanations that "our appellate courts are interested
in and do feel a duty to the production of a result which satisfies, placed
upon a ground which also satisfies," and that "One can indicate this
crudely as the presence of a felt duty to Justice, a felt duty to The Law
17.

See Hampshire & Hart, Decision, Intention and Certainty, MIND, Jan. 1958, p. 1.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

556

and a third felt duty to satisfy both of the first two at once, if that
be possible.""8
The author believes that the general idea of "Justice" has little
direct effect in the daily operations of the courts. He prefers to view
the judges' task in terms of avoiding unfair or unjust results, and suggests that words such as "fair" and "right" "come close to the flavor
Llewellyn
of the justice-duty as it cooks and works in the men."'"
makes clear that he is engaged at this point, not in analysis but in the
description of processes as they work. Yet one may question whether
the terms and distinctions which he prefers, make any substantial contribution to the description of the processes. However great the desire
to keep key terms blunt and simple, the need persists to apply more
philosophical thinking and the teachings of Jurisprudence which Llewellyn knows so well, to the problems with which he deals.
Accepting his statement about his work-"A job is the job it is,
and it is not any other,"2 we may ask how his many helpful and stimulating generalizations and insights perhaps may be seen in a different
perspective and with a different emphasis. His insistence on the recognition of the case resources available to the judge and advocate, the
skills which are possible of attainment by them if they focus attention
on the cases and the problems and permit these to filter through their
own psyches, his rejection of the fear that conscious self-critique by
judges and lawyers will cripple or kill the better doing of their jobs,all these and more-are highly valuable. Yet his devotion to such terms
as "craft" and "craftsmanship," "horse sense," "situation-sense,"
"singing reason," "opinion-kernel" and others, often suggests an inadequate acceptance of the intellectual process. There seems to be a
glorification of a human ability, unaided by other than craft techniques,
to intuitively recognize right and wrong judicial decisions. Intellectual
and intellectualizable processes include far more than logical deduction.
Their role in the law can be great even if, as Llewellyn contends, there
could be two right answers to a case, or even when selection of the answer depends on the circumstances.2
A recent analysis of moral judgments stated:
The age of innocence is over; Descartes' Discourse on Method
imposes epistemological sophistication on us; we are no longer
18. P. 59.

19. P. 60.
20. P. 516.
21. P. 213, n. 206.
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free to assume naively that we have knowledge without the
epistemological enquiry into its sources and tests.22
Of course, Llewellyn was not required to adopt such an approach.
What he has written so earnestly and emphatically deserves careful
reading and re-reading by both the Bench and the Bar. Yet we may
recognize that the appellate process is increasingly facing methodological
problems of tremendous scope and importance. For example, there
is the problem of the relevancy to a decision of competing knowledge
claims, as illustrated by the question as to why the pain to negro children
from school segregation is constitutionally decisive, while the threat
of social disorder from school integration, even if true, is properly rejected. Developing a logical structure to exhibit the relationships between such competing claims may provide further progress in the
"reckonability" with which Llewellyn deals. To achieve such progress,
better tools are needed.
A number of recent analyses have application to the task Llewellyn
is pursuing. For example, Hall has referred to Austin's quarrel with
the intuitional school which asserted that man has an instinct or sense
of justice which instantaneously recognizes and approves the good and
disapproves the bad. Hall points out that Austin insisted that a theory
of morality was fallacious which could give no reasons for such approbation and disapprobation, other than ascribing them to an innate instinct. Hall concluded that it makes little difference where one's thinking begins; that what is important is where and how it ends, and even
more, that inquiry proceed without inhibition as to its scope or character
and without deliberate intention to support a particular school of thought;
and that unfortunately, however sincere the endeavor, equal sensitivity
to reason and reality remains largely an ideal.2 "
Northrop's conclusion in his recent analysis of "The Complexity
of Legal and Ethical Experience," that one's philosophical theory of
the ultimate nature of reality, and of man as a factor in reality, defines
his values,2 also would seem to be relevant to problems in deciding
appeals. If this is the case, responsible reckonability would be enhanced
by making explicit the philosophical theory a method assumes. The
importance of such explicitness is emphasized if appellate method is
considered from the points of view expounded by Hampshire, in his
22. Schuster, Peter Glassen on the Cognitivity of Moral Judgments, MIND, Jan.
1961, p. 97.
23. Jerome Hall, Reason and Reality in Jurisprudence,7 BUFFALO L. REv. 361, 403
(1958).
24. NORTHROP, THE COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL EXPERIENCE, 233 (1959).
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"Thought and Action." We are reminded that one may picture to
himself various courses of action, but that he cannot, without some aid
from conceptual thinking, deliberate upon alternatives-he only can
rehearse them. 5 Judicial reflection, like other instances of reflection
may explore alternatives better if it is aware of the classification it has
accepted in making the exploration. Hart's classification of human
actions with which law deals, in terms of description and in terms of
ascription of responsibility for actions, also would seem a vital one
in considering the appellate process.26 Indeed the entire field of Jurisprudence and the philosophy of science may offer helpful and needed
analogies for the judicial appellate process.
Conceding to the author that-"A job is the job it is, and it is not
any other," the problem remains as to how the decision of appeals can
avail itself of knowledge from all disciplines which can contribute to
law. The ancient Greeks, Hampshire tells us in another context, "were
fascinated by the intelligence manifested in a craft, which they saw to
be so different from the articulate and verbal intelligence of the law
court and the assembly, or from the exactly communicable calculations
Whether or not the Greeks were
of doctors and mathematicians."2
correct in seeing the intelligence of the law court, of the assembly and
of doctors, as different from that manifested in a craft, the needs of
today demand more than what ordinarily are called "craft-skills," in
the presentation and decision of appeals. Yet it matters little what
terms are used to emphasize the skills required for the appellate method
which Llewellyn seeks to formulate. The development and clarification
of a philosophy of appellate method must be a continuing challenge if
the long range results of the method are to withstand critical reflection.
JAMES L. 1VIAGRISHt
HAMPSHIRE, THOUGHT AND ACTION 220, 214 (1959).
26. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights in LOGIC AND LANGUAGE
145 (Flew ed. 1952).
27. HAMPSHIRE, supra note 25 at 193.
25.

t Member, Ohio and District of Columbia Bars. Lecturer on Jurisprudence, College

of Law, University of Cincinnati.

